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THE SYSTEM OF THE TWO TRUTHS IN THE 
PRASANNAPAD.A. AND THE MADHYAMAK.~VAT~,RA: 
A STUDY IN MADHYAMIKA SOTERIOLOGY 
Although the world may quarrel with me, I have 
no quarrel with the world: that which is considered 
to exist in the context of the world I also assert as 
existent; and that which is considered not to exist 
in the world I also assert as non-existent. 
Sam. yuttanikdya, 22.64.103 ; as cited 
by Candrakirti in Prasannapadd, p. 370, 
and Madhyamakdvatdra, p. 179. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the Madhyamakakdstra, nirvdn.a is described in very 
uncompromsing terms. Nirvdn.a is the ultimate truth, 1 it is reality (tattva). 2 
Nirvdn.a is not dependent on anything whatsoever, it is entirely at peace and 
absolutely unsusceptible to conceptualization. 3 When the mind has become 
inactive, when the business of  the world with its dichotomy between subject 
and object has come to a complete standstill because the chaos of  birth, 
old age and death is no more, then one is said to have arrived at the final 
beatitude of  nirvdn.a. 4 Candrakfrti states quite clearly that "it is utterly 
impossible for nirvdn.a to be attained by any path that has to do with 
sam. sdra, the beginningless cycle of  birth and death", s Whereas samsdra is 
ignorance, nirvdna is the ultimate truth. 6 Samsdra is bewilderment, passion 
and enmity, and nirvdna is complete tranquility. Understood in this way, 
as final release from all the misery of  birth, decay and death, nirvdna is 
the goal o f  the Buddhist Path, the raison d'etre of  Buddhist philosophy 
and practice, and the ultimate concern of  N~g~rjuna's MadhyamakaJdstra. 7 
And yet, if nirvdna is an absolute denial o f  sam. sara, then how are we to 
interpret karika XXV. 197 - 
Sam. sara is not the slightest bit different from nirvana; 
nor is nirvana the slightest bit different from sam. sara. 
Like much of  what N~garjuna wrote, this stanza appears to stand in absolute 
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defiance of the tradition which preceded the development of  Mhdhyamika. 
Worse yet, kdrika XXV. 19 and others like it lend themselves to no facile 
interpretation even within the context of the M~dhyamika system itself. 
As we shall see in what follows, the words nirvdna and samsara are 
representative of two broad divisions of  technical terminology within the 
Madhyamaka~dstra. On the one hand, the term sam. sdra quite naturally 
aligns itself with other words like avidyd, svabhdva and duh.kha, all of 
which seem to coalesce around the generic concept of samvr.ti, the relative 
or conventional truth. On the other hand, nirvdna, ~anyatd, ~dnti and many 
other terms from the second division are grouped very conveniently under 
the rubric of paramdrthasatya, the ultimate truth. Such terminology is used 
to illuminate various particular nuances of meaning within each of the two 
principal divisions. For instance, whereas samsdra and nirvdna are primarily 
of soteriological significance, svabhdva and ~anyatd refer to ontological 
issues, and the terms duhkha and ~nti  denote two specific affective states. 
Samvrti and paramdrtha are not necessarily the most important concepts 
within these two classes of terminology, but they are in a sense the most 
general or unmarked terms, and therefore they are especially significant 
for the purposes of  philosophical investigation. Any one of these words 
carries with it connotations stemming from its association with the other 
words of its class, yet this is perhaps most evident in the case ofsam, vrti 
and paramdrtha, for each one dearly reflects the entire range of  meaning 
associated with its respective division. This should become evident when we 
take a closer look at the system of the two truths. 
1.1. The Nature o f  the Problem 
If  we were simply confronted with these two distinct classes of terminology, 
then the situation would not be nearly so complex as it actually is. Upon 
first glance, both divisions seem to represent very neatly packaged groups 
of concepts: sam. sdra is bondage, nirvdna is liberation; svabhdva is unreality 
and ~anyata is reality; sam. vr.ti is error or falsehood and paramdrtha is 
truth. One can locate literally hundreds of passages in the literature of  the 
M~lhyamika to support this type of strictly dualistic understanding of these 
words. However, there are many places, as in kdrika XXV. 19, where the 
boundry between the two groups seems to blur or to break down altogether, 
and these places serve as focal points for a great deal of the philosophical 
controversy which has surrounded the M~dhyamika system since the time 
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of  Nag~rjuna. Over the years, such passages have been a thorn in the side 
of  many of  Nggarjuna's apologists, and at the same time it is certain that 
conundrums like the one presented in kdrika XXV. 19 are the vital centers 
of  Mfidhyamika thought. They cannot be summarily dismissed, and still 
it seems as if no single approach is adequate to explain their significance 
within the pattern of  the system as a whole. Clearly the issues involved are 
not merely of  passing interest, since one may easily argue that it is to just 
such lines as those quoted above from kdrika XXV. 19 that we must look 
in order to find solutions to several very important problems. 
1.2. The "Linguistic'Interpretation o f  Mddhyamika 
Most recently, a sort of  linguistic analysis has shown itself to be one espe- 
cially fruitful method of  unravelling the paradox presented by these passages. 
With specific reference to karika XXV. 19, D. Daye summarizes the 
conclusions of  this linguistic approach: 
The above suggest that such distinctions and limits are merely context restricted but 
still seductive bits of language. One is also led to the suggestion that the distinctions 
of language (witness nirvdna and sa.msdra) are merely and only internally consistent 
and are only pragmatically correlated with our perceptions. This is quite enough and it 
is quite reasonable. However, such a view entails no non-circular conclusion about 
anything which is said to escape the warm boundries of human care (duh.kha) and the 
bewitching motherhood of talking (samvrtisatya). 8 
According to this analysis, the philosophy of  the M~dhyamika embodies 
a special meta.language which has the particular capability to "diminish the 
magical attachments to and obscurations o f o u r  inner language". 9 Elsewhere 
in the same article Daye writes: 
The implications of the ontological status of language-descriptions and their correlations 
with the publiclly known objects in the furniture of the world lead one to the conclusion 
that all ontological descriptions are merely pragmaticaliy useful but provisional fictions. 
They guarntee only that what is known is simply (and tautologically) consistent with 
what is known. That is, no conclusions about the transcendental or ultimate nature 
(yathdbhatam) are authorized by statements verified by public or private observation: 
rather, what can be known (explicitly)/s to be known. 10 
1.3. "Reality as Fiction" - A Soteriological Approach 
There is little question that Daye's interpretation is justified on the basis 
of  the Mfidhyamika's own concept o f  "dependent designation" (pra]~aptir 
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updddya), and I have taken this analysis as my  point  o f  departure for what 
follows. However, as we shall soon discover, the works of  early Indian 
philosophers are not  always so explicit as one might desire with respect 
to these issues, and this is especially true in the case of  questions regarding 
the ontological status o f  the world. Precisely what are the implications o f  
this view of  language and conceptual thought,  a t t r ibuted to the Madhyamika, 
which asserts that  "all ontological descriptions are merely pragmatically 
useful but  provisional fictions"? In an article entitled "Everyday Reality 
as Fiction - A Mfidhyamika Interpretat ion" 1~ Charles Crittenden makes 
the following very interesting observation with respect to the system of  the 
two truths:  
I th ink . . ,  that this distinction is best explicated in terms of a difference in the 
standpoint one can take in regard to the world and the kinds of attitude which are 
poss~le given these standpoints. To try and interpret the two-truth idea ontologically 
would not seem promising: for on the Mfidhyamika view, at least, there is not some 
transcendental reality over and above everyday reality which could be denoted by 
expressions in the higher troth. Rather this and the lower truth both concern the familiar 
world; hence some non-metaphysical approach seems best and certainly the notion of 
an attitude, already present in the analysis of the motivations of the reality-as-fiction 
proposal, suggests itself.12 
Elsewhere in the same article Cdt tenden goes on to say, 
Buddhism is after all not only, or even especially, a set of philosophical doctrines but 
is intimately connected to the practice of meditation and the experiences thereby 
sought for. Someone who adopted typical Buddhist philosophical theories but who 
had no interest in meditational practice or in certain sorts of experience would hardly 
qualify as Buddhist - a point made again and again in Buddhist literature. And 
certainly much of Buddhist theorizing can be regarded as attempting to articulate 
concepts and principles explaining and justifying meditation and the kinds of 
experience which this aims at producing.la 
What is the nature o f  the relationship defined by  samvrti and paramdrtha? 
What exactly is given in the context of  mundane experience (loka-sam. vrti)? 
Finally, how is this content  analyzed by  the M~dhyamika, and how is it 
transformed, i f  at all, through the experience of  nirvdn.a? Over the course 
o f  the next several pages I intend to examine Candrakfrti 's  two major 
philosophical treatises, and by  means of  this examination I hope to reveal 
the degree to which his work demonstrates an awareness o f  these questions 
not  simply as linguistic problems, but  also - and primarily, I believe - 
as soteriological issues. 
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The M~dhyamika's concept of language implies a particular attitude 
towards the world, or better yet, a particular way of seeing this world as 
it is O, athabhatam). As a Buddhist philosopher, Candrakfrti not only assumes 
that such a yogic vision is indeed possible, but he clearly states that he has 
taken this assumption as the touchstone for his own philosophical analysis. 14 
Therefore, by taking a closer look at these texts I expect to accomplish two 
primary tasks: first, to clarify the original terminology of this literature; 
and second, to develop an appreciation of the M~dhyamika's concept of 
language within the context of his own fundamental belief in the possibility 
of liberation through the yogic vision of phenomena as empty of intrinsic 
being. 
2. NIHILISM, ETERNALISM AND THE MIDDLE WAY 
When we turn to the history of the controversy that has surrounded 
N~g~rjuna's philosophy, it is immediately evident that debate has focused 
time and time again upon a few crucial topics, and from among these topics 
there is certainly none that has inspired more elaborate and heated rhetoric 
than has the issue of nihilism. The spectre of nihilism obviously haunted 
N~g~rjuna's work from the beginning, and despite Candrakfrti's spirited 
efforts to dismiss the problem, one is perhaps never really convinced 
that Candrakfrti himself, after all, did not do more than his share to maintain 
a comfortable place for this unwanted guest. To start with, let us investigate 
the nature of the allegations raised against the M~dhyamika by his opponents, 
so the issue is acutally not that of nihilism alone; rather it has to do with 
the problem of nihilism and eternalism versus the Middle Way. 
It is not difficult to isolate the source of these charges of nihilism. 
Throughout the Madhyamaka~dstra N~g~rjuna rejects every possible argument 
designed to substantiate the existence of apparent phenomena. If it is true 
that the M~dhyamika denies the existence of all that contributes to mundane 
experience, then his opponents may well be justified in their fear that such 
a position differs very little from the nihilist's rejection of all meaning 
whatsoever. Indeed, by far the most serious accusation of all was brought 
to bear against the M~dhyamika by his own fellow Buddhists: 
If everything is empty, then nothing comes into or goes out of existence. Consequently, 
for you the four noble truths themselves do not exist 15. . .  and by expounding [the 
emptiness ofaU things] you reject the three jewelsA 6 
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It is difficult to avoid reading the denial of  being (bhdva) as anything 
other than an acceptance of  non-being (abhava) with all the dire implications 
o f  such a posit ion; and yet ,  according to Nag~rjuna and Candrakfrti ,  this 
represents a grave misunderstanding of  the M~dhyamika's brand of  negation. 
Being is not  rejected in favor of  non-being, but  rather being and non-being 
are both  denied in order to provide access to a seperate vantage point  from 
which the world is seen to be neither absolutely real nor absolutely false. 
Moreover, it is important  to note the particular way in which Nag~rjuna 
and Candrakfrti  countered the accusation leveled just above: 
In response to this we contend that you do not know the purpose (prayo/ana) of 
emptiness, nor emptiness itself, nor its meaning. And therefore you are lost. 17 
In his commentary to this stanza Candrakfrt i  explains the "purpose" o f  
emptiness in the following way: 
Through your own misconceptions you, sirs, have mistakenly assumed that emptiness 
is non-existence, and directing such accusations against u s . . .  you become the victims 
of great distress and so you are totally lost. What this means is simply that you are slain 
by a variety of pure fantasies.. .  And therefore, because you do not comprehend the 
intrinsic nature of things as they are, your characterization [of emptiness] is senseless 
and bears no relationship whatsoever to our own explanations. Then what is the purpose 
of emptiness? This is stated in [Madhyamaka~a-stra, XV. 1], the chapter dealing with 
examination of the self: "Liberation follows from the destruction of both karmic 
action and the afflictions. Karmic action and the afflictions arise from relfied notions 
(kalpana-) [of real and unreal things], and these are produced from conceptual diffusion. 
Conceptual diffusion, however, ceases in emptiness." This being the case, emptiness is 
taught in order to effectively tranquilize the process of conceptual diffusion (prapaaca), 
and therefore the purpose of emptiness is the tranquilizing of all conceptual diffusion. 
On the other hand, in imagining that emptiness means non-existence you, sirs, actually 
strengthen the net of conceptual diffusion and do not in the least understand the 
purpose of emptiness. 18 
The purpose o f  emptiness is dear ly  soteriological. Further  along in this 
same section of  his commentary Candrakfrti  reminds us that the term 
"emptiness" is itself simply a linguistic device, but  he seems to feel that  we 
would be less l ikely to lose touch with this fact if  we understood the concept 
in a broader context  which took into account the soteriological purpose 
of  the Madhyamaka~dstra. 
Candrakfrti  holds this distinction to be most critical: whereas he conceives 
o f  "eternalism" (~dsvatavdda) as the reified concept o f  "being" (bhdva) and 
nihilism (ucchedav&ta) as the reified concept o f  "non-being" (abhdva), 
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the Middle Way is distinguished from both of these as a third alternative 
which is presented as the single philosophically viable description of the 
true nature of  phenomena. 
How are we to approach the notion of the Middle Way? Perhaps the 
best advice at this juncture comes from N~garjuna, when he tells us that 
"those who do not understand the distinction between the two truths 
cannot possibly understand the profound truth of the Buddha's teaching".19 
Therefore, we shall proceed with an investigation of the system of the two 
truths. 
3. THE SYSTEM OF THE TWO TRUTHS 
All entities bear a dual nature, which corresponds to the entity as apprehended by 
either correct or incorrect perception. The object revealed by correct percpetion is 
reality (tattva), while that revealed by incorrect perception is referred to as the 
Truth of the Screen (sam. vrti-satya). 2° 
3.1. Samvrti 
• . 
3.1.1. General characteristics o f  the "screened truth". A very concise 
introduction to the nature of  this "screen" is provided in the 24th chapter 
of the Prasannapadd, where Candrakfrti mentions four general characteristics 
of samvr.ti. 21 
(1) Samvr.ti is complete and total covering (samantddvara.nam). This 
means that the phenomena of the world are not what they seem to be; they 
are false (mos.a) and misleading, because they do not actually exist as discrete 
entities. Although we take the contents or our perceptions for granted, when 
closely examined through the medium of the M~dhyamika dialectic our 
beliefs about the world prove to be riddled with contradiction. So-called 
solid objects dematerialize under the force of the dialectic. 
(2) Samvr.ti is the ignorance (avidyd) that arises from the total obscuration 
of the reality of  individual entities. "Precisely because it obstructs [awareness 
of] the intrinsic nature [of all phenomena], delusion is a screen (sam. vr.ti); 
and on its account what is merely fabricated appears as real." 22 Ignorance is 
the source of suffering in the world, 23 for it is said to be conjoined with all 
the other afflictions of  covetousness, anger, pride, attachment to false 
theories, and doubt or cynicism. This is samvrti as the misery of samsdra. 24 
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(3) Sam. vrti is the circumstance that all things exist in dependence on 
each other; that is to say, that they are founded on each other in a 
relationship def'med by absolute reciprocity. Each of  the dements of  mundane 
experience is dependent for its own existence on a collocation of  causes 
and conditions. This is sam. vr.ti as dependent origination (pradtyasamutpdda). 
(4) Sam. vr.ti is characterized as the signs and symbols (sam. keta) which 
make possible the business of  the world (loka-vyavahdra). This is also 
samvr.ti as samsdra, not as suffering, however, but rather in the affectivdy 
neutral sense of  language and conceptual thought. 
3.1.2. Conventional knowledge. Candrakirti accepts four valid means o f  
knowledge (pramana) associated with samvrti: 2s (1) inference (anumdna); 
(2) authority (agama); (3) analogy (upamana); and (4) sense perception 
(pratyaks.a). These pramana.s are totally dependent on the objects which 
they reveal, and the objects are equally dependent on them: 
Insofar as there are means of knowledge, there are objects of knowledge; and insofar 
as there are objects of knowledge, there are means of knowledge. It is certain that 
neither the means nor the object of knowledge can be established as existent in and of 
itself. 26 
The primary significance of  this def'mition of  pramd.na is that for 
Candrakfrti neither "the world" (/oka) nor any other single entity (bhdva) 
can be absolutely affirmed. There can be no "being-in-and-of-itself" 
(bhdvasvabhdva), nor any means o f  knowing such a substance even were it 
to somehow exist. This effectively constitutes a refutation o f  "eternalism" 
defined as any sort of  substance ontology that entails a reification of  the 
objective referent posited by a word or concept. It also seems to imply that 
neither the world as a whole nor any other individual entity can be absolutely 
negated: there can be no valid reification o f  the concept of  "non-being" 
(abhdvasvabhdva); that is, non-being can only be conceptualized in 
opposition to being. This is a very important point for Candrakfrti, and 
one which he emphasizes by stating that "it is on this account that the 
w o r d  must exist just as it is perceived".27 A third and final ramification 
of  this notion o f  pramdna is brought out in Madhyamakdvatdra, VI.31 : 
Mundane experience is not authoritative in every respect, and therefore it does 
not contradict any dealings with reality. However, if an object of mundane experience 
is negated through recourse to [a metaphysical argument used] in the context of 
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mundane experience, then the testimony of mundane experience may itself 
effectively be used to contradict that negation. 
Essentially this is a restatement o f  the f'trst two points already mentioned 
above, since it is nothing more than a restriction placed on all four 
prama.na.s which limits their authority to the realm of  sa .mvrti. In the 
auto-commentary, however, the implications of  this karika are made 
clear. There we are told that one may not legitimately negate the objects 
given in mundane experience by relying on an argument that is drawn 
from testimony supposed to lie outside the socio-linguistic context 
defined by this common experience. Only the testimony of  mundane 
experience itself may be effectively used for this purpose, and this is enough 
for the M~dhyamika. Candrakfrti writes in the summary to his position on 
this issue: 
One accepts "production from another" on the consensus of mundane experience, 
and thus he avoids being contradicted by the world. On the other hand, according to 
mundane experience it is also the case that there is not production from another, and 
one may desire from this point of view to refute production from another, which 
would then entail no contradiction by the world. 28 
This is the method of  the dialectic, which claims to reveal the true nature 
of  sam. vrti not by resorting to any substance ontology or metaphysical 
position, but simply by drawing attention to the fact than certain basic 
notions taken for granted by the world, as for instance the idea of  causality, 
are logically untenable. We will have occassion to explore the implications 
o f  this approach to negation in greater detail, 29 but first we must briefly 
review the types of  samvr.t~ that are found in Candrak~rti's writings. 
3.1.3. The types ofsamvrti. Madhyamakdvatdra VI. 25 sets forth the two 
principal divisions of  samvrti: 
That which, within the realm of mundane experience, is apprehended by any of the 
six unimpaired sense faculties is true according to mundane experience, while any 
remaining reified concepts are false according to this same criterion. 
On this basis we must discriminate between the truth of  samvr.ti (sarg. vr.ti. 
satya), and conventional error (mithya), or what Candrakfrti refers to as 
"mere samvr.t~" (samvr.timdtra)) ° Within each of  these two divisions we 
may further extrapolate two subcategories that can be defined according 
to the type of  pramdn.a associated with the objects contained in each 
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category. This being the case, I have contructed the following table which 
provides an outline o f  the various types o f  sam. vrti implicit ly recognized 
by  Candrakfrti:  
I. False sam~ti (mithydsamvrti, or sam. wtimdtra) 
General characteristics o f  the class 
(first three pramdna-s) 
(a) mere words (~abdaradtra) 
(b) philosophical concepts 
(i) Buddhist dogma 
(ii) Non-Buddhist dogma 
(fourth pmmdna: pratyaksa ) 
(c) impaired perception 
( r~. sddar~ana ) 
(d) meditative visualizations 
Specific example 
"son of a barren woman" 
(vandhydp~tra ) 
"mind only", or repository 
consciousness" 
(cittamdtratd, 
aTa y a vi] Ftdn a ) 31 
"Self" (dtman) 
hallucination, mirage, 
distortions due to an 
optical defect 
skeletons visualized during 
a~ubhamanasikdra 32 
II. True sam. vrti (sam~tisatya) 
General characteristics o f  the class 
(first three pramd.na-s) 
(a) objects of veridical mental cognition 
(fourth pramdna: pratyal~.a) 
(b) objects of veridical sense perception 
Specific example 
' T '  or "ego" (ahamkffra) 33 
as agent or patient 
in mundane affairs (i.e. 
as founded on the 
skandha-s) 
mundane entities (form, 
sound, odor, taste and 
tactile phenomena) 
Now let us a t tempt  to establish a few generalizations on the basis o f  
this chart. The subdivisions according to pramdn.a were made in order to 
facilitate enquiry into the criteria for distinguishing t ruth from error at 
the level o f  sam. vrti. In general, Candrakfrti 's view of  the matter  seems clear 
enough - for him any conventionally real object is "real"  only insofar as 
it is acknowledge to exist within the socio-linguistic nexus o f  cause and 
effect which constitutes samvrtisatya. 34 What this means is simply that every 
real phenomenon is both  an effect founded on a particular collocation o f  
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causes and conditions, and a cause or condition with respect to the other 
phenomena which serve as its own effects. Assuming for the moment that 
this quality o f  efficacy is indeed the sole criterion for membership in the 
class of  conventionally real objects, we will proceed to judge the types o f  
sam. vrti mentioned above using it as our standard. 
(1) Sam. vrtisatya. It is obvious that any object of  veridical sense percep- 
tion can be accounted for in terms of  its efficacy within some cause-effect 
continuum: e.g. the son is an "effect" as produced from his father and 
mother, and a "cause" when, as an adult, he becomes the progenitor of  his 
own offspring. The same standard also seems to apply in the case of  objects 
o f  valid mental cognition. The conventionally valid notion o f  a self or ego 
is founded on cognition of  the psycho-physical constituents (skandha-s); 
which is to say, the ego is an effect produced from the particular collocation 
of  causes and conditions represented in the Buddhist analysis the body, 
consciousness, feeling, apperception and the predispositions. If  this definition 
of  the ego seems to reduce the individual personality to a mere tautology, 
then we should note that this is in some sense precisely the point: the self 
is recognized as an effect because it is produced from the psycho-physical 
constituents as cause: and the psycho-physical constituents are a cause, 
in this context,  to the extent that they are reponsible for production of 
the concept of  "se l f '  as their effect. The same is of  course true for all 
other phenomena: 
When the carriage does not exist then the "possessor of parts" does not exist and 
neither do the parts themselves. 3s 
And furthermore, from the auto-commentary: 
Composite phenomena which are characterized by the false [appearance of] intrinsic 
being are produced in dependence on the error of ignorance. For example, the sprout 
which is characterized by the false [appearance of] Intrinsic being is itself produced 
in dependence on a seed which is also characterized in the same way. Likewise, one 
should understand that all things whatsoever, as causes and effects, are characterized 
by the false [appearance of] intrinsic being. 36 
(2) Mithydsam. vrti. Types I.c and I.d contain objects perceived by means 
of  a sense faculty that is somehow "impaired". This impairment can be 
the result of  internal factors like disease (e.g. ophthalmia) or temporarily 
induced meditative visualizations; or the result of  external factors like a 
mirage or a magical illusion. In any case, these objects are false because they 
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do not possess any efficacy within the causal nexus defined by objects o f  
veridical sense perception. As regards the objects included within types I.a 
and I.b, each of  them is in its own way outside the scope of  any conceivable 
causal continuum by definition. Such objects are defined as mere concepts 
that have originated in mental defects stemming from faulty logic or wrong 
beliefs that may or may not have been cultivated through speculative 
philosophy. 37 
3.1.4. Concluding remarks with respect to samvr.ti. Candrakfrti briefly 
characterizes the nature of  sam. vr.tisatya, or conventional truth, in 
Madhyamakdvatara, VI .158-59 :  
Even though the [existence of the carriage] must remain unproven.., either in reality 
or in the context of mundane experience, nevertheless here in the world it is designated 
in dependence on its parts, without critical analysis. 
This very [carriage] is a possessor of parts and pieces, it is referred to in the world as 
an "agent", and for common people it is even established as the appropriator (upddatr.). 
Do not lose touch with the screen taken for granted by the world. 
It is clear that sam. vr.ti is not to be dismissed as totally unreal, since 
phenomena are real insofar as they interact with each other as cause and 
effect. Therefore, when samv.rti is referred to as illusion (mayd) this does 
not so much emphasize the unreality o f  the world as it does the fact that 
one may not validly reify the objective referent posited by a word or concept  
According to Candrakfrti, entities cannot legitimately be described through 
recourse to reified concepts of  "reality" and "unreality", since these notions 
and all others are valid only within the context ofsam, vr.ti. "Meaning" is 
defined solely in terms of  relationship, and for this reason, to reify the 
concept of  reality or unreality by extracting either one from the context 
of  its relationship with the other is to deprive it of  any possible meaning. 
3.2. Paramdrthasatya 
We have now gained some insight into the realm of  mundane experience, 
where notions o f  "existence" and "non-existence" or "real" and "unreal" 
may legitimately be applied, but when it comes to the sphere ofparamatha 
the situation is quite different. All teachings of  the Buddha are said to be 
nothing more than various means towards the understanding of  ultimate 
truth, and for this purpose he necessarily availed himself o f  language which 
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is, properly speaking, viable only in the context of  sam. vrti. Candrak~rti 
explains this technique in the following way: 
What is the characteristic of this reality which one may gain access to through the 
teachings of the Blessed Ones? We have already stated [in Madhyamaka~a-stra, XVIII.7 ] : 
"When that which is to be named is no more, then the sphere of [conceptual] thought 
must also cease." When this is the case, then what more can be asked? Nevertheless, 
even though this is so, still, in conformity with conventional truth one accepts mundane 
notions of "real" and "unreal" and so forth, and attributes characteristics to reality 
(tattva) by a process of imputation (samdropatah). a8 
3.2.1. General characteristics o f  the Ultimate Truth. At first glance, the 
concept of  ultimate truth seems to represent everything that samvr.ti is not: 
(1) Paramdrtha is complete clarity, it is the removal or cessation o f  
obscuration. 39 It is that which "makes sense" in that it does not appear to 
be other than it really is. 4° It is reality (tattva), not as opposed to unreality, 
but either as (a) the direct vision of  things as they truly are (yathabhata- 
dar~ana); or (b) the total destruction of  reified conceptual constructs - 
particularly those embodied in the notions of  " I"  and "mine" - which is 
accomplished through immediate awareness that no ultimately real substance 
is ever apprehended either in association with living beings or with insentient 
objects. 41 
(2) Paramartha is tranquility or peace (bant/), in the sense that it represents 
the cessation of  ignorance and all the other afflictions. This is pararndrtha 
as nirvd.na. 42 
(3) Paramdrtha is the absence of  all reifying thought (nirvikalpa); 4a it is 
the end of  the process of  assigning labels and the end of  the labels themselves; 
it is the termination o f  subject and object. It is the cessation of  worldly 
affairs, since the transactional sphere o f  mundane experience is not possible 
in any ultimate sense. 44 
(4) Pararndrtha is not dependent on anything other than itself. 4s It neither 
arises nor does it perish. 46 Paramdrthasatya is emptiness (ganyata). The 
meaning of  emptiness is "the absence o f  intrinsic being" (ni.hsvabhdva), 
and this absence of  intrinsic being is, as we shall see, directly perceived by 
the yogi as a characteristic of  samvrti as well as of  pararndrtha. 47 
3.2.2. Paramdrtha as the yogic vision. Presumably, even if paramartha is not 
an ultimately real substance still this long list of  attributes must pertain to 
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something, and there is ample evidence in the writings of Candrakfrti to 
attest to the fact that this "something" is actually an attitude towards the 
world - an attitude embodied in the yogi's direct vision of things as they 
are. I will now review the evidence for this claim, and clarify what is meant 
by the expression "direct vision". 
In his Prasannapadd Candrakfrti states that the ultimate truth is 
pratytitmavedya dryd.ndm, 48 which seems to indicate that although 
paramartha can be obliquely designately through signs and symbols, still 
it must ultimately be known in and through itself in the individual experience 
of the saints. 49 In the auto-commentary to his Madhyamakdvatdra, 
Candrakfrti again explains that "the ultimate meaning (paramdrtha) for 
the Buddhas is just that intrinsic nature (svabhdva; i.e. emptiness) and 
although it is paramdrthasatya.., still each must individually come to 
know it on his own." so Moreover, it is not only the Buddhas and the saints 
who can know the ultimate truth in this way, for Candrakfrti continues: 
Having taught about sam. v.rtisatya, the author desires to teach about paramdrthasatya. 
However, because it is inexpressible and not within the sphere of [conceptual] 
knowledge, so it is impossible to teach of it as if it were a ."thing" (bhdvatah.). Therefore, 
he will provide an example for those who want to learn, so that they may illuminate 
its intrinsic nature through their own personal experience (rah gis myoh ba aid du). sl 
Candrakfrti's willingness to "provide an example for those who want to 
learn" is justified by no less a personage than Nhg~rjuna himself: 
The ultimate truth cannot be taught without relying on convention, and without 
understanding the ultimate truth nirvd.na will not be attained, s2 
Nevertheless, if the ultimate truth must eventually be known through 
direct realization, then what exactly is the role of the k~tra-s in this process? 
Candrakfrti authorizes his career as a philosopher with an unusually candid 
admission of the limitations of his own knowledge: 
The yogis have directly perceived entities in this way (i.e. as devoid of intrinsic being), 
and we others who desire to obtain the wisdom of the yogis have our highest aspiration 
directed towards those words that explain the intrinsic nature of phenomena. Although 
we do engage in explanation of the absence of intrinsic being in entities, still this is done 
through the medium of philosophical treatises like this one which is infused with the 
wisdom of the yogis. These words are not dependent on my own ideas, since my eyes 
are still covered over by the cataract of ignorance, s3 
This passage is interesting not only as an all too rare display of humility, 
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but also because Candrakfrti seems to be defining "the wisdom of  the yogis" 
not as perception of  some particular object, but as a mode of  seeing all 
phenomena: "The yogis have directly perceived all entities in this way 
('di Itarg~igs ~in)." This mode of  seeing phenomena is elsewhere referred 
to as "non-seeing" :4  In fact, so far as I know, emptiness is nowhere defmed 
as an object of  knowledge (]aeya), but only as "the direct seeing of  
phenomena as devoid of  intrinsic being".ss Apparently the yogi does see 
the things of  the world, but he does not see them in the same way as the 
non-yogi seems them, since the yogi's perception of  things is not grounded in 
reified concepts concerning the ultimate reality or unreality of  conventional 
objects. 
We will have more to say about this later on, but at this point I would 
like to digress for a moment from our investigation into the system of  the 
two truths and devote some space to examination o f  the technical term 
svabhdva, which has already been referred to above both as "intrinsic being" 
and "intrinsic nature". The concept is particularly important, since a correct 
understanding of  the term svabhdva goes hand in hand with any real 
appreciation of  M~dhyamika soteriology. 
4. THE AMBIVALENT MEANING OF THE TERM SVABH,~VA 
In the following passage from the Prasannapadd Candrak~rti uses the term 
svabhdva in both of  its two very distinct meanings: 
What is the quintessential nature (dharmata-) of phenomena? Their svabhdva. And 
what is svabhdva? Original, fundamental nature (prakr. ti). And what is the original, 
fundamental nature? Emptiness. And what is emptiness? The absence of any svabhdva. 
And what is the absence of svabhdva? Suchness (tathata-). And what is suchness? 
"Being-as-it-is", invariableness, eternal stability. 
Already the ambivalence is clear enough, since svabhdva has been equated 
with the absence of  svabhdva. Candrak~rti continues with a finn definition 
of  the term: 
Whatever is possessed by fire or any other phenomenon that is never produced because 
it is not dependent on anything other than itself and because it is not artificially 
fabricated, that is referred to as svabhdva. 
Svabh&a defined in just such terms could easily be translated as "intrinsic 
being", which is of  course the concept that serves as the primary target for 
92 C .w .  HUNTINGTON, JR. 
all the apparatus o f  the Madhyamik dialectic. In this passage, though, 
Candrakfrti also intends for his reader to understand the word in its other 
sense, as a synonym for emptiness: 
What is taken under the influence of the optical defect of ignorance to be, in whatever 
way, ordinary existence (bhdvajdta), becomes, by means of "non-seeing", the object 
of the saints who are rid of the optical defect of ignorance. That alone is the essence 
[of phenomena], and it is established as svabhdva for the saints, defined as follows: 
svabhdva is unfabricated and not dependent on anything other than itself; so it has 
been established by the various masters, and so it should be understood. This svabhdva 
("intrinsic nature") possessed by all entities is in essence unproduced, and therefore, 
because it is non-existence insofar as it is not really anything whatsoever, it is the absence 
of any svabhdva ("intrinsic being"). Thus it must be understood that entities do not 
posses any svabhdva. 
Although the double entendre o f  the term svabhdva defies accurate 
translation here, still we can quite easily grasp the import of  the passage. 
Svabhdva is defined by Nigarjuna as "that  which is unfabricated and not 
dependent on anything other than itself ' ,  s7 but this definition can be applied 
equally well to either of  two very different referents. 
(1) Svabhdva as "intrinsic being". The concept of  intrinsic being is, 
according to Candrakfrti, the primal ontological error which lies at the root 
of  all forms of  suffering in the world, since it is the foundation for grasping 
at the notions of  " I"  and "mine".  Intrinsic being is actually the reification 
of  "relative being", i.e. of  "being as opposed to non-being". This is svabhava 
either as the speculative concept of  non-Buddhist systems, or as the conceptual 
ground that structures the experience of  common, naive people (i.e. non-yogis) 
in a very profound way. 
(2) Svabhdva as "intrinsic nature". Although phenomena do not possess 
any intrinsic being, they do possess an intrinsic nature. This intrinsic nature 
is not a "thing" (vastu or dravya), but rather a way in which they are related 
to each other. It is the circumstance under which all phenomena both 
arise and perish, and the Madhyamika characterizes these circumstances as 
"dependent origination" (pratrtyasamutpdda). Since all entities arise and 
perish only in dependence on each other, they do not possess any "intrinsic 
being", and this is their intrinsic nature of  emptiness. It is the simple fact 
of  their appearance in the world - "simple" insofar as it is unelaborated by 
any concept o f  an existence that is not the mere reflection of  non-existence. 
This svabhdva as the "object" of  the direct vision of  Buddhist saints and 
yogis: it is as much a "way of  being" (for phenomena) as a ' 'way of  seeing" 
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(for the yogi). Let me clarify what I mean here by referring back to Candrakfrti 
once again. 
In the section from the Prasannapadd quoted above we find another 
brief description of the manner in which all phenomena become objects 
of the saint's vision. Being and non-being, reality and unreality, and all 
other such conceptual dichotomies, are necessarily assigned to the sphere 
of ordinary existence, where each member of the pair derives its meaning 
only in contrast to its opposite. "Meaning" or "existence" only in the 
context of reciprocal dependence is the primary distinguishing characteristic 
of samv.rti, ss and Candrakfrti draws attention to this fact in the following 
words: 
That which exists in dependence on a reciprocal object (or "meaning": artha) does not 
exist - thus the saints have declared, s9 
And in the auto-commentary to this section: 
Just as the existence of "long" is [dependent] on "short", while the existence of 
"short" is [dependent] on "long"; or the existence of the far bank is [dependent] on 
the near bank, while the existence of the near bank is [dependent] on the far bank: so 
it is that whatever is imputed in this way does not have any existence through intrinsic 
being. 6o 
Elsewhere, in the Prasannapadd, Candrakfrti explains the way in which 
"non-existence through any intrinsic being" is not to be equated with 
absolute non-existence. "Existent" and "non-existent" are equally untenable 
as characreristics of the ultimate truth about phenomena. I quote here from 
the Madhyamaka~dstra, kdrika X. 11, followed by Candrakirti 's commentary: 
How can a supposedly dependent entity be dependent if it does not exist? On the other 
hand it does not make sense that an existing entity should be dependent on a dependent 
entity. (X. 11) 
Something called fire depends on something called fuel: it will be dependent on the fuel 
either insofar as it - the fire - exists or does not exist. If it is non-existent then because 
of its non-existence it will not, like the horns of a rabbit, be dependent on the fuel. 
Again let it be the case that it exists. Then because it already exists, how could it depend 
on fuel? So not even as existing does it exist in dependence, because that would be 
meaningless. The case of fuel is to be demonstrated in the same way. 61 
Apparently, the vision of the saint has no object other than this very 
realm of ordinary existence, which is seen by a sort of "non-seeing". He 
perceives the things of the world as they are: (1) they are unreal because 
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they lack any svabhfiva "intrinsic being");  and yet  (2) they are real because 
it is their svabhdva ("intrinsic nature")  to arise and cease in the world through 
the force o f  dependent origination. This is their emptiness. 
5. THE NEGATION OF SAM. VR. TI: QUALIFIED OR ABSOLUTE? 
Thus far I have developed a fairly cohesive schematic representation o f  
the system of  the two truths. I have examined the problem of  "reciprocal 
meaning" as it relates to the doctrine o f  dependent  origination. Despite 
the fact that we perceive them as originating and passing away in t ime, all 
phenomena which appear in the world are "real" or "unreal" only in the 
web of  cause and effect defined as dependent origination. Each o f  the twin 
components in any dichotomy is dependent on the other for its existence, 
in the case of  an enti ty,  or for its meaning, in the case of  a concept.62 We 
are now in a bet ter  position to assess the nature of  the dichotomy which 
obtains between paramdrtha and sam. vrti. 
5.1. The Concpet o f  "dependent Origination"" 
The word "svabhava" is defined as " that  which is unfabricated and not  
dependent on anything other than itself", 63 and just above we have seen 
how this definition can be made to apply either to the false concept of  
reified existence or to the t ruth o f  emptiness. In both cases we refer to the 
distinguishing characteristic of  all phenomena, their innermost essence which 
is "unfabricated and not  dependent  on anything other than itself". From 
among the many expressions that are synonymous with svabh#va as the 
ultimate truth,  one of  the most important  is pratTtyasamutpFzda, a term 
which itself embodies a great deal of  ambiguity. In the Prasannapadd, 
Candrakfrti  has this to say about dependent origination: 
The Blessed One clearly demonstrated that things arise in dependence on causes and 
conditions and he rejected the possibility that origination could be without cause, 
from one cause or from a multiplicity of causes, or that things could be produced 
from themselves, from what is other than themselves or from both. By this rejection 
the conventional nature (sam. vr. ta-svarapa) of conventional things is revealed for what it 
really is (yatha-~vasthitam): Dependent origination is thus itself conventional (sam. vr. ta) 
because it is not produced through any intrinsic being [even though it appears otherwise 
to the non-yogi]. From the perspective of the wisdom of the saints, there is in 
[prat~tyasamutpdda ] no cessation and no movement. . .  Nfigfirjuna will expound 
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throughout this entire treatise that the characteristics of cessation and so forth do not 
apply to dependent origination. 64 
Here is a very significant clue to the nature o f  the relationship between 
ultimate and conventional truth: paramdrtha, as pratTtyasamutpdda, is 
itself sam. vrti, because it appears as other than it really is. 
Thus what should be obvious is here continued: the dictotomy of  
paramdrtha and samvrti is, like all dichotomies, simply another aspect of  
conventional truth, and therefore the unqualified negation of  sam. v.rti on 
any grounds whatsoever must necessarily constitute an equally unqualified 
negation of  paramdrtha. This fact must carry with it rather profound 
implications with respect to the system of  the two truths, and yet I have 
been unable to find any passage either in the Prassanapadd or in the 
Madhyarnakdvatdra where these implications are clearly spelled out and 
discussed in satisfying detail. Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, on reading 
Candrakfrti one is after all still left with the lingering suspicion that the 
world is somehow absolutely rejected from the perspective of  the ultimate 
truth. Before closing, we must turn for one last look at a few especially 
problematic themes. 
5.2. The Use of  Metaphor and Simple to Describe the Yogic Vision 
One very common motif  in both the Prasannapadd and the Madhyamakdvatdra 
is the use of  metaphors and similes in which the world is equated in one way 
or another with an illusion. We may take the simile of  the mirage as an 
example of  the type: Under certain conditions the slanting rays of  late 
afternoon sunlight can produce the impression of  clear, blue water; but 
for those who are nearby, the situation is quite different. Here sam. vrti is 
compared with the mirage. Is this an unqualified rejection of  apparent 
phenomena? I quote from the Prasannapadd: 
Similarly, those who are far removed from seeing the reality of these things called 
'T '  and "mine" as they are, who tread the path which leads through the cycle of birth 
and death, they are under the sway of the error of ignorance and so for them [the 
self], which is imputed onto the psyehophysical constituents, appears as ff it were 
real (satyatah.) even though it is definitely a false object (m~drtha eva); but for those 
but for those nearby who see the reality of these things, [the serf] does not appear as 
if it were real. 6s 
In another very frequently used simile the appearance of  conventional 
phenomena is compared to the visual distortions caused by certain forms 
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o f  optical  disease. This t ime I refer to the au to -commenta ry  o f  the  
Madhyamakdvatdra: 
Suppose that a man with diseased eyes is holding a bone white vase in his hand, and 
under the influence of an optical defect he sees what appear to he clusters of hair on 
the surface of the vase. He wants to remove the hairs and so begins to shake the vase 
when a second man with normal vision happens to pass by. Puzzled as to this odd 
behavior, the second man approaches and begins to stare at the place where the hairs 
should appear. Naturally, he apprehends no such hairs and consequently he forms 
no conception of existence or non-existence, of hair or non-hair, nor even of 
darkness or any other attribute with respect to these hairs. When the man with 
an optical defect tells the second man about his idea that he sees hairs, then the 
second man may desire to clarify this misconception by stating that the hairs do not 
exist. This is indeed a statement of negation, however the speaker has not in this 
case maligned [any conventionally real entity]. The man without any optical defect 
sees the reality of the hairs, while the other man does not. In just the same way, there 
are those who are striken with the optical defect of ignorance so that they are incapable 
of perceiving what is real; the intrinsic nature of the skandha-s, dhdtu-s and dyatdna-s 
which is apprehended by them is simply a [false] conventional form. The Blessed 
Buddhas, however, are without any trace of ignorance so that they perceive the hairs 
in the manner of one who is not afflicted with an optical defect; that is, the intrinsic 
nature of the skandha-s and so forth seen by them is the ultimate troth of these things. 
One may ask how it is that they are capable of seeing an intrinsic nature like this, 
which is invisible. - True, it is invisible, but the fact is that they "see" it by means 
of "non-seeing". 66 
In the  first o f  these two  passages the concept  o f  a " se l f "  is compared  to 
a mirage, and in the second,  the intrinsic na tu re  o f  the skandha.s and so 
for th  which is perceived by  ignorant  people  is compared  to  the i l lusory 
appearance o f  hairs created by  an optical  defect .  I f  we do no t  pay very 
close a t ten t ion  to the inner structure o f  these similes, then  we may  be led 
to conclude that  the appearance o f  sa.mv.rti is absolute ly  false, ye t  such 
a conclusion would  leave several apparent  discrepancies unresolved.  
The first example  is relatively easy to explain:  The mirage appears to be 
real only  for those standing at a distance, bu t  for  those who  unders tand 
the  mechanism involved,  " i t  does no t  appear as i f  i t  were real".  The concepts  
o f  ' T '  and " m i n e "  are like a mirage insofar as they  possess no ul t imate  
reali ty;  however  - and this is o f  critical impor tance  - wi thin  the  con tex t  
o f  sam. v.rti, as we have seen, these concepts  are causally efficacious,  and to  
this ex ten t  t h e y  are qui te  different  f rom the  mirage which is unreal  even at 
the  convent ional  level. I t  is evident  upon  closer inspect ion that  the  simile 
here is valid and useful on ly  to  a certain point .  
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The second example is slightly more subtle. In commenting on this 
particular simile, Candrakfrti  makes the following observation: 
Those with an optical defect see hairs, flys, and gnats and other such things which are 
not real; and although they are instructed by those with unimpaired vision, still, unlike 
these other people, they themselves are not able to realize the true nature of the hair 
as it really is, by simply not seeing it. On the contrary, on the basis of the instruction 
they have received from those with unimpaired vision, they develop a merely theoretical 
grasp of the fact that the hair is false. When, however, their eye of awakening is annointed 
with the salve of the direct vision of emptiness, which cures any optical defect, and they 
develop an understanding of reality, then these people realize for themselves the reality 
of the hair - by not realizing it. 67 
In interpreting this second example we must be especially careful to  
note that  the hairs are compared with the intrinsic nature of  conventionally 
real things like the skandha.s and so forth, and not  with the skandha-s 
themselves. Thus the simile must be explained in this way: Just as the hairs 
are falsely imputed to the surface of  a conventionally real vase, so a quality 
of  intrinsic being is falsely imputed to apparent phenomena which are 
themselves only conventionally real. And just as the truth of  the hairs is 
"seen by  non-seeing", so the intrinsic nature of  all conventionally real 
phenomena is "realized by  non-real izat ion".~ There is neither something, 
nor nothing, to realize. 
5.3. The Defense of  Sam. vrti 
Thi~ mysterious ambivalence with respect to the ontological status o f  sam. v.rti 
permeates Candrakfrt i 's  work. There are places where he seems to be rejecting 
sam. vrti outright, and in still other passages he rushes in to protect  sam. vr. ti 
from unqualified negation. In the auto-commentary to the Madhyamakftvatara 
he plainly states that paramarthasatya is not used to negate that  which is 
taken for granted within the context  of  mundane experience. 69 I f  someone 
is concerned because his proper ty  has been stolen then we are told that  the 
M~dhyamika philosopher does not  t ry  to console him with the assurance that 
"all proper ty  is of  the substance o f  a dream",  since such statement would not  
be in accord with what is given in mundane experience .7o In one o f  his lighter 
moments Candrakfrti  chides his opponent ,  the Vijfi~aav~din, with the 
following invitation: 
If mundane experience does not contradict you, then go ahead and reject the things of this 
very world. Quarrel with the world if you want to, and afterwards I will side with winner. "~1 
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According to Candrakfrti the M~idhyamika would not presume to interfere 
with the business of the world: 
Because we maintain that [cause and effect] are like magical illusions, therefore no 
faults accrue to us and the entities of the world are left intact. 72 
Time and time again throughout chapter six of  the Madhyamakdvatdra 
Candrakfrti rises up in defense of samvrt/as though it were his own wife: 
he himself can abuse and malign her, but woe be unto anyone else who might 
dare to suggest that she is not without fault. In fact, he actually goes so 
far as to accuse his opponents of being the true nihilists: 
On account of his passion for a teal substance, inherent in our opponent's view, all the 
ordered conditons taken for granted in mundane experience have been laid to waste. 73 
5.4. The Yogi's Att i tude Towards Samv.rti 
We have already seen that sam. v.rti can serve either as the object of mundane 
perception or as the sphere of the saints and yogis (dryd.~m. vis.ayam). 
Candrakirti does not attempt to describe the experience of the yogi who 
directly realizes the ultimate truth, but he does tell us something about 
the response of the yogi to this "direct seeing" of  things as they are: 
When the yogi realizes that sam. vr. tisatya is set up through mere ignorance and is devoid 
of intrinsic being, understanding that emptiness is the characteristic of paramdrtha 
immanent within sam. vrn', he does not fall into the extremes of dualism. He does not 
say to himself, "What once was, now is no more", and then go on to accept nihilism 
after not apprehending any intrinsic being within entities. He does not reject worldly 
convention which is like a reflected image, nor does he reject [the elements of mundane 
experience like] karma and its fruits, or the distinction between that which is right and 
that which is wrong (dharma and adharma). And finally, he does not reffy paramdrtha 
by imputing a quality of intrinsic being to [any or all] entities, because he sees that 
things like karma and its fruits abide within objects that are devoid of intrinsic being, 
and not within objects that possess intrinsic bieng. 74 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our investigation has come full circuit here, and we return now to the question 
posed by Madhyamaka~dstra XXV. 19: What does it mean to say that nirvd.na 
and sa.msdra are not  at all different? Candrakfrti himself supplies a rather 
succinct response to the puzzle when he writes, "sa .msdra and nirvd.na are 
of the same essence because both are by nature at peace".Ts The calm that 
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lies at the center of  the storm of  birth and death is revealed only to a select 
few, however, and these are the yogis who take sam. sara as the object o f  their 
"non-seeing". 
Candrakfrti insists that the yogic experience is "the end of  the process 
of  assigning labels and the end of  the labels themselves". At this point I 
feel confident that this statement ought to be interpreted in two ways: 
First, it should be regarded as a hyperbolic device used by the M~dhyamika 
to drive home his claim that emptiness is a "non-referring" term, or, in the 
language of  Professor Daye, a "third-order capstone reflexive concept".76 
Therefore, it would be improper to reify the concept of  emptiness, forcing 
it to serve as the ultimate truth about any privileged representation within 
the mind or any object "out  there" in the world. Second, and perhaps more 
important, such an assertion stresses the significance of  a certain attitude 
towards mundane experience. All phenomena appear "empty"  to the yogi 
who has completely internalized the dialectic o f  the M~dhyamika, and in 
this sense "emptiness" is both a "way of  being" and a "way of  seeing": 
That which, taken as dependent or conditioned, is of the nature of birth and death, is, 
taken as non-dependent and unconditioned, declared to be nirvdn.a. 77 
Nirvdna is emptiness, ~ and emptiness is understood as the direct realization 
of  the absence of  intrinsic being within all phenomena. 79 The absence o f  
intrinsic being is not to be equated with non-existence but rather with 
dependent origination, s° and dependent origination is all that there is to 
mundane experience, at Therefore the key to the relationship between 
sa.msara and nirvana, or sam. v.rti and paramdrtha is to be found in the formula 
of  dependent origination; and because dependent origination is the mark of  
both conventional and ultimate truth, it is the Middle Way: 
A chariot is designated in dependence on its parts, the wheels and so forth. Whatever 
is designated in dependence on its own parts is not produced through any intrinsic 
being, and the non-production through any intrinsic being is emptiness. Emptiness, 
defined as non-production through any intrinsic being, is itself the Middle Way. That 
which is not produced through any intrinsic being cannot possibly be existent; and yet 
because it lacks non-being neither can it be non-existent. Therefore, on account of 
its avoiding the two extremes of being and non-being, emptiness, clef'meal as non- 
production through any intrinsic being, is called the Middle Way, or the Middle Path. 
So it is that the following expressions are various synonyms for dependent origination: 
emptiness, dependent designation, and the Middle Way. 82 
Paramdrtha, as emptiness or dependent origination, is the intrinsic 
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nature of  all particular phenomena; yet if this intrinsic nature is taken to be 
an object set apart from the context of  its relationship to those phenomena, 
then it loses any possible meaning, because no characteristic can be understood 
apart from the object(s) which it characterizes, sa 
What is called sa .mv.rt/is not pure sa .mv.rt/, insofar as its intrinsic nature is 
paramdrtha; and at the same time, what is called paramdrtha is not pure 
paramdrtha since it is of the nature ofpratrtyasamutpdda to appear as 
sam. vr.ti, s4 Neither of these two concepts can be isolated from the other and 
reified into "absolute truth without reference to error", or "unmitigated error 
without reference to truth". Like the components of any other dichotomy, 
paramSrtha and sam. vr.ti require each other in order to yield any meaning. 
This seems to indicated that for the Madhyamika the world is now and must 
always remain a mixture of truth and error, and this might easily prove to be 
the most profound insight expressed through the dichotomy of the two truths: 
Paramdrtha is a reference to apparent phenomena - it refers to the particular 
way in which phenomena appear to the yogi - and the term can have meaning 
only so long as there are apparent objects and a perceiving subject. 
At the close of the last chapter of  his Prasannapadd Candrakfrti quotes 
the following two lines from an unidentified source: 
It was taught by the Lord of the world that nirvdn.a is no nirvd.na; 
A knot tied by space is undone by space, as 
The knot is tied when the categories of "real" and "unreal" are reified; 
and it is untied, that is, sam. Mra becomes nirvd.na, when each one of these 
concepts is seen to be meaningless in and of itself. I do not see how we could 
interpret Candrakirti as saying that the world either does or does not ultimately 
exist; nor could it be justifiedly claimed that its ontological status is in any way 
actually altered when the world becomes the object of  the yogi's direct vision. 
Presumably, this is why Candrakfrti is able to claim that "in nirvd.na there is 
no extinction of anything whatsoever, nor any cessation of anything whatsoever. 
Nirvd.na is in essence the complete disolution of reifying thought." a6 
According to Candrakfrti the world is something more than our misconceptions 
about it, since dependent origination is not itself merely a misconception. 
This being so, the question still remains: Just what is the ontological status 
of the world; and when the distortion created by reifying thought is eliminated, 
what is left of mundane experience? This question brings us around again to 
the issue of "dependent designation" (pra/aaptir upddaya), which was taken 
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as the point of departure for this essay. In his Madhyamakdvatdra, Candrakfrti 
cites this expression as one of the synonyms for pratftyasamutpdda: s7 
A reflection that is mere designation is founded on a collocation of [causes and conditions] 
including the face and other things which themselves exist as mere designations; a house 
is designated as dependent on its beams and other structural components which are also 
mere designations; and a forest is similarly designated as dependent on trees. Just as in 
a dream one apprehends a sprout that is unproduced through any intrinsic being, so it 
is equally reasonable that no entity exists apart from its own designation; and this 
designation is founded on [a collocation of] other entities which are themselves mere 
designations, ss 
There is no question about the fact that our experience is shaped to a very 
great extent by our conceptual frames, yet it is difficult to determine just how 
deeply our perceptions of a given situation (and the actions based on them) 
are grounded in these patterns of thought. This is an issue of the utmost 
importance primarily because these conceptual frames supply most, if not all, 
of the meaning and structure that determines our motives and so guides our 
behavior in the course of daily life. Moreover, it is clear that many of the 
concepts which govern our acts are in themselves quite abstract and almost 
wholely dependent on other concepts from which they derive their meaning. 
The mechanism is illustrated quite graphically in a recently published study of 
metaphorical thought :a9 If we did not at some level structrue our concept of 
"argument" through the metaphor of "war", then would we still "attack our 
opponent's position", or "retrench and defend" our own? Our behavior under 
such circumstances is obviously shaped by the metaphorical application of a 
second concept, and yet, must we necessarily think in terms of "winning" or 
"losing" an argument, or could the experience defmed by the concept of 
"argument" be conceived of in an altogether different way, perhaps as "dance" 
rather than as "war"? If both participants were to conceive of argument through 
the metaphor of "dance", then we might assume that their behavior would be 
governed by a desire to establish understanding through balance and harmony, 
rather than through victory and defeat. 
This process of structuring one concept in terms of another, layer after layer, 
most certainly exerts a profound effect on the overall pattern as well as the 
details of our experience. In the study cited above, the authors have done an 
excellent job of laying bare this innate tendency of conceptual thought. 
However, if the M~dhyamika analysis is correct, they overlook wfiat may be the 
most deeply rooted and pernicious of all metaphors: "reality as substance". 
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What does it mean to conceive of  the ultimate truth as "dependent  origination" 
rather than as a substance - whether it be a privileged representation within 
the mind, or a real external object? The non-referential theory of  language 
and conceptual thought, embodied in all the apparatus o f  the Madhyamika 
dialectic, entails two primary consequences: 
(1) It serves to enforce the strictly pragmatic use of  words and concepts 
in a given socio-linguistic matrix; and 
(2) It acts as a safeguard against any tendency towards the application 
of  words or concepts to private objects supposed to lie outside this socio- 
linguistic matrix; or, in the jargon of  the M~dhyamika, it brings an end to 
"conceptual diffusion" (prapa~ca). 
In the context o f  Western philosophy, a very similar non-referential 
theory of  language is associated with the name of  Ludwig Wittgenstein: 
We may say that the general criteria by which the later Wittgenstein judges philosophical 
utterances to be nonsensical is the pragmatic criterion of meaning. This is shown by his 
submitting philosophical statements to questions such as: "What use can we make of 
that statement?" "What practical consequences is it supposed to have?" "Under what 
circumstances, to achieve what, would you say that? ' '9° 
This approach to language and conceptual thought not only represents the 
theoretical statement of  a particular philosophy, but moreover, it necessarily 
implies a subtle, yet  highly significant paradigmatic shift in the purpose of  
philosophizing. I f  the meaning of  words and concepts is to be judged by 
strictly pragmatic criteria, then the value of  philosophy itself can no longer 
be measured solely - or even especially - in terms of  its success as a f'mely 
tuned system of  abstract, logical propositions. This is certinaly not to suggest 
that scholastic or academic viability is not essential to any philosophy;i t  
is simply to point out that, given this particular view of  language, academic 
success alone would not only constitute a rather hollow philosophical victory, 
but a meaningless one as well. Like the M~dhyamika, Wittgenstein also seems 
to have been essentially motivated in his work by a very pragmatic sense 
of  purpose, a purpose which lay not in explaining the nature of  reality so 
much as in changing our attitude towards the world of  mundane experience: 
I am in a sense making propoganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another. 
I am honestly disgusted with the o ther . . .  Much of what I am doing is persuading 
the people to change their style of thinking. 91 
We might rephrase the question posed just above and ask: What would it 
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mean to live in a world where one's concepts were no longer structured in 
a very crucial way by reifled notions of  "reality" and "unreality"? I submit 
that the overriding concern here is neither ontological nor epistomological 
after all, for, reflecting on these questions, I am once again reminded of  
Candrak~rti's assertion that one is lost if he does not understand the purpose 
of  emptiness, which is "the tranquilizing o f  all conceptual diffusion". 
Liberation follows from the destruction of both karmic action and the afflictions. 
Karmic action and the afflictions arise from reified notions [of real and unreal things], 
and these are produced from conceptual diffusion. Conceptual diffusion, however, 
ceases in emptiness. 92 
Unlike either a strictly rational philosophy or a metaphysical system, 
the M~dhyamika does not seem to be preoccupied with sophisticated 
epistomological or ontological explanations of  reality. On the contrary, 
the dialectic is apparently designed to expose the meaninglessness of  any 
such attempts at explanation, and in doing so, to "make propaganda" for 
a style o f  thinking that should lead to a conception of  ultimate truth as 
duh.kha-nirodha, or the cessation of  all suffering, by altering one's attitude 
towards everyday experience in this world. 
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